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Were one to draw a Venn diagram that put leading administrative law judgments in 
one circle, and leading migration and citizenship jurisprudence in another, Roncarelli 
v Duplessis1 and Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)2 would 
fall in the overlapping zone. Each judgment belongs in the canon of jurisprudence 
about the meaning of citizenship and each articulates an expansive vision of the rule 
of law. 
 
I want to explore aspects of the relationship between citizenship and the rule 
of law in Canada. I do not advance the extravagant claim that the rule of law has no 
purchase on the state’s assertion of power over non-citizens. But I do contend that a 
kind of immigration exceptionalism dilutes the rule of law’s operation in relation to 
non-citizens.   
 
I begin by setting out some uncontroversial attributes of the rule of law. I then 
provide snapshots from legislation, jurisprudence, and “law in action” that exhibit 
countercurrents at work in migration law that divert, attenuate or dissipate the force of 
these rule of law principles.  I begin on a high note, by considering the role played by 
citizenship in Roncarelli and Baker respectively. Next, I present vignettes from the 
ordinary operation of immigration and refugee law to illustrate the tenuous grasp of 
standard rule of law principles in this sphere. Finally, I offer tentative suggestions 
about the source of this immigration exceptionalism. 
 
 
II . The Rule of Law 
 
A central tenet of the rule of the law is that the exercise of state power through law 
must be accountable to law. The rule of law thus positions itself against arbitrary 
exercise of public power.  Beyond that, the scope, content, and power of the rule of 
law are each and all contested. Even Justice Rand’s conception, which invokes an 
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1 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689 [Roncarelli]. 
2 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193 [Baker]. 
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“implied bill of rights”, is more expansive than some, but I do not intervene in that 
debate here3 or purport to offer a comprehensive account of the rule of law. 
 
For 19th century constitutional lawyer AV Dicey, fidelity to the rule of law 
required subjection of “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, […] to the 
ordinary law of the realm.”4  The private individual and the state actor were equally 
subject to law, and equal before the law, and equally amenable to the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary tribunals.”  A commitment to the dignity of the legal subject is embedded 
in the norm that the state is answerable for the exercise of power over private 
individuals. In recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada uses the phrase 
“culture of justification” to evoke what an administrative state permeated by the rule 
of law might look like.5    
 
The availability of judicial review as the main forum for supervising 
government officials in their exercise of statutory power is another element of the rule 
of law. State actors cannot be the final arbiters of their own power; the independence 
and expertise of the judiciary is important to the legitimacy of review.6 The 
intrusiveness of judicial review has been blunted by the doctrine of judicial deference, 
but access to the courts remains so vital to the Supreme Court of Canada’s vision of 
the rule of law that it endowed judicial review of administrative action with 
constitutional protection under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.7   
 
Finally, a basic requirement of the rule of law is that state officials, tribunals, 
agencies, boards, commissions, and Ministers who acquire power by statute must act 
within their statutory mandate. Actions that exceed their jurisdiction are ultra vires.  
This idea of jurisdiction as bounded authority trades on geographic metaphors of 
bordered space.  In this sense, it resonates with the contemporary nation-state defining 
itself through the policing of geopolitical borders. But whereas judicial review is 
preoccupied with preventing power from spillage over jurisdictional boundaries, 
immigration and citizenship law in a world of nation-states is obsessed with protecting 
borders from unauthorized incursion. To foreshadow my conclusion, one way of 
expressing the tension animating this article is to suggest that policing borders against 
                                                 
3 For a helpful overview of the rule of law and its application, see Mary Liston, “Administering the Canadian 
Rule of Law” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
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of Rights” (1994) 10:1 SAJHR 31 at 32; and David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik's 
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23. Article 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights enshrines a right to judicial review, Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZ), 1990/109 art 27.  See Hanna Wilberg, “Interrogating ‘Absolute  Discretion’: Are  NZ’s  Parliament  
and  Courts  Compromising  the  Rule  of  Law?” (2017) 45:4 Fed L Rev 541. 
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entry by non-citizens tends to exert greater force than the rule of law’s concern about 
preventing state power from escaping the jurisdictional boundaries of lawful authority.  
 
But for the moment, I simply want to emphasize the dignity of the legal subject, 
access to judicial review, and fidelity to statutory mandate as foundational and 
relatively uncontroversial ingredients of the rule of law.  I now turn to examining how 
these principles manifest in immigration and citizenship law. 
 
 
A. Citizenship and the Rule of Law 
 
Citizenship signifies membership in a community. For the last few hundred years, the 
most salient community has been the political unit of the nation-state.  But citizenship 
has many facets, two of which matter for present purposes. One is the legal status of 
citizenship. That is the citizenship that entitles one to enter and remain in Canada. 
Non-citizens do not have that right. People acquire citizenship status by birth on 
Canadian soil or to a citizen parent, or by immigrating and subsequently naturalizing 
as citizens.  The person who lacks the legal status of citizenship on the territory she 
inhabits is a migrant, a non-citizen, a foreigner, an alien, or a stateless person if she 
has no citizenship anywhere.  
 
A second dimension of citizenship, “substantive” citizenship, addresses the 
experience of membership in a political community – the enjoyment of the rights, 
benefits, entitlements, as well as the performance of the duties and obligations of 
citizenship. One of the most influential accounts of substantive citizenship was offered 
by British sociologist T.H. Marshall in his 1951 book Citizenship and Social Class. 
For Marshall, “[c]itizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties 
with which the status is endowed.”8  On this version, citizenship is not a pre-requisite 
to rights; it is the outcome or the label we attach to those who already enjoy them.  
Marshall conceived of rights in broad terms, and organized them into three groups: 
civil rights (freedom of speech, religion and contract, property rights, and the rule of 
law); political rights (the franchise, the right to stand for office), and social rights 
(income support, education, and health care).     
 
Marshall’s hypothesis was that the gradual expansion and extension of rights 
to marginalized groups within the nation-state marks the functional enrolment of the 
people into citizenship. They become citizens – in the substantive sense – through 
recognition as bearers of political, civic, and social rights. But note that Marshall’s 
model is closed. It presupposes, as do many contemporary scholars, that his subjects 
are always already citizens in the legal sense.  In the model of Marshallian citizenship, 
the opposite of the citizen is not the non-citizen, or the foreigner, but rather the 
“second-class citizen.”  And when someone complains of being a second-class citizen, 
they expose the gap between the promise of equal citizenship and the reality of 
                                                 
8 TH Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class” in Gershon Shafir, ed, The Citizenship Debates: A Reader 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 93–111 at 102.  
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discrimination, subordination, and marginalization. The normative task of his project 
is to make good on the promise of equal citizenship. But non-citizens who complain 
of injustice cannot access the language of second-class citizenship – because the easy 
rejoinder is that they are not citizens. They must fasten their claim to an identity that 
transcends or is otherwise independent of citizenship.    
 
Importantly, the rule of law does not disavow non-citizens: all those subject 
to law are legal subjects for purposes of the rule of law.  And yet, within any polity 
that operates on a citizenship paradigm – which is to say, all states – claims of non-
citizens (qua non-citizens) that sound in the rule of law seem less audible to courts and 
to state actors. I want to explore what accounts for the muffling.  
 
 
B. All Law’s Subjects 
 
Frank Roncarelli and Mavis Baker were both outsiders. Their stories are well known 
to recent generations of lawyers and law students. Mr. Roncarelli was a Jehovah’s 
Witness of Italian background in 1950s Quebec, a time when the Catholic Church and 
autocratic Premier Maurice Duplessis ruled social and political life in that province.  
The Jehovah’s Witnesses were vehement and relentless critics of Catholicism. Premier 
Duplessis vowed “a war without mercy9” against the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and his 
government enacted various laws to suppress their proselytizing activities. Frank 
Roncarelli did not distribute Jehovah’s Witness literature, but he acted as a surety for 
co-religionists who were arrested for doing so. That was the motive for permanently 
revoking his liquor licence and thereby destroying his business. The Quebec statute 
regulating the sale of liquor in Quebec made the issuance, extension, refusal, or 
cancellation of a liquor licence a matter of broad statutory discretion. The 
government’s argument was that since a liquor licence was a privilege, not a right, 
Roncarelli had no basis for contesting whether or how the privilege was revoked: if 
you are not entitled to something in the first place, you are not entitled to complain if 
it is taken away. 
 
In Justice Rand’s account, Frank Roncarelli is not only a businessman and a 
Jehovah’s Witness, but also a citizen, and it is on citizenship that Rand J’s judgment 
repeatedly alights.10  No other judge directly mentions it.11  The work that citizenship 
performs in Justice Rand’s judgment is to fortify the legal link joining Roncarelli to 
his liquor licence in two ways. The first is rhetorical. To be identified as a citizen is to 
partake in a rank or honorific that entails a certain stature, esteem, and worthiness in 
relation to the state and the community.  A liquor licence may be a statutory privilege, 
                                                 
9 William Kaplan, The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Fight for Civil Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1989) at 250. 
10 Matthew Lewans’ excellent and illuminating article examines the role of citizenship in Roncarelli v 
Duplessis with particular regard to the influence of US constitutional jurisprudence on Justice Rand, and 
the consequent distinctiveness of Rand’s constitutionalism (as manifested through the “implied bill of 
rights” jurisprudence) compared to a narrower Diceyan constitutional model. Matthew Lewans, 
“Roncarelli’s Green Card: The Role of Citizenship in Randian Constitutionalism” (2010) 55 McGill LJ 537.  
11 Justice Abbott quotes a passage from Dicey that refers to citizens. Roncarelli, supra note 1 at 184. 
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but Roncarelli is not a mere supplicant, approaching the sovereign with bowed head 
on bended knee for the favourable exercise of discretion. He stands in a particular and 
dignified relationship to the state as citizen, and his stature underwrites the insistence 
that a citizen not be treated arbitrarily.  
 
Justice Rand’s presentation of citizenship hews closely to T.H. Marshall’s 
idea of civil citizenship: “the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the 
person; freedom of speech, thought and faith; the right to own property and to conclude 
valid contracts, and the right to justice.”12  Both Justice Rand and Marshall adopt the 
traditional liberal characterization of these freedoms as negative – freedom from 
government interference – rather than as positive claims on government; Marshall 
channeled the latter into the category of “social rights”.   
 
So, for example, Justice Rand observes that, “in the absence of regulation,” 
the sale of liquor would be “free and legitimate”.13 The state’s arrogation of the power 
to licence the sale of liquor, then, represents a restraint on the exercise of the civil 
rights of property and contract. This classically liberal characterization of liquor 
licencing as state diminution of the freedom of the citizen sets the stage for Justice 
Rand’s resolve that the exercise of discretion “should be conducted with complete 
impartiality and integrity; and that the grounds for refusing or cancelling a permit 
should unquestionably be such and such only as are incompatible with the purposes 
envisaged by the statute”.14 
 
The other right in play in Justice Rand’s judgment is, of course, freedom of 
religion. Thanks to Premier Duplessis’ hubris, the record before the Supreme Court of 
Canada was replete with proof that Duplessis orchestrated the revocation of 
Roncarelli’s liquor licence to punish Roncarelli for posting bail for fellow Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. Roncarelli was, after all, a man of “some means”15 who, for that reason, 
was in a position “as a private citizen, an adherent of a religious group” 16 to furnish 
bail, an otherwise lawful act. For this, Duplessis sought the “destruction of his 
economic life”.17  
 
Justice Rand alerts us to the fact that equal citizenship is at stake here because 
of the discriminatory motives that lay behind Duplessis’ action:  Roncarelli’s right as 
a private citizen to engage in commerce was denied to him because of his faith. The 
decision to revoke his liquor licence on grounds irrelevant to any legitimate statutory 
purpose thus represented nothing less than “arbitrarily and illegally attempting to 
                                                 
12 Marshall, supra note 8 at 94. 
13 Roncarelli, supra note 1 at 140. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid at 131. 
16 Ibid at 133. 
17 Ibid at 141. 
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divest a citizen of an incident of his civil status.”18  In Marshallian terms, Duplessis 
attempted to strip Roncarelli of his civil citizenship – to make him a second-class 
citizen. 
 
The other important thread running through Justice Rand’s judgment is the 
attention to the significance of the state’s action from the perspective of the legal 
subject. Here, it is instructive to compare his judgment to Justice Cartwright’s dissent. 
For Justice Cartwright, the story begins and ends with the fact that a liquor licence is 
a privilege whose scope and content depends exclusively on the one who confers it. 
The privilege and the essence of a privilege is that the benefactor can retract it. The 
legislator could have chosen to impose constraints on its own discretion. But having 
granted itself unfettered discretion, Justice Cartwright concluded that the Legislature 
intended the commission "‘to be a law unto itself’.”19 
 
While conceding its formal character as privilege, Justice Rand devotes 
considerable attention to the important role a liquor licence plays in the life of the 
citizen, and how its withdrawal detrimentally affects his  
“vital interests”: “[a]s its exercise continues, the economic life of the holder becomes 
progressively more deeply implicated with the privilege while at the same time his 
vocation becomes correspondingly dependent on it.”20  And so, even though a liquor 
licence is a mere privilege from the state’s perspective, the impact of its revocation on 
Mr. Roncarelli lends weight to the claim that the state must exercise its discretion in 
accordance with the purposes of the statute, in good faith, without discrimination or 
arbitrariness.  Although the reliance interest that Justice Rand implicitly invokes is a 
standard feature of private law doctrine, deploying it in public law enables him to pivot 
from the state’s perspective on the loss of a licence to the citizen’s perspective. This 
is an enduring component of Justice Rand’s legacy.21 
 
So now let me fast-forward to Mavis Baker: if Frank Roncarelli was an 
outsider to the Quebec of the 1950s, Mavis Baker was even more an outsider to Canada 
in the 1990s. She was an impoverished Black woman, a domestic worker, a single 
mother with several children, and a person living with significant mental health 
challenges. But more than this, Mavis Baker was a so-called “illegal” immigrant – she 
had been working and residing in Canada for over 10 years with no legal status.  She 
was a non-citizen with no legal authorization for her presence in Canada, and so an 
outsider in the most technical, totalizing and starkest sense.  
 
Like Roncarelli, Mavis Baker sought a “privilege” – in her case, the 
favourable exercise of statutory discretion (known as humanitarian and compassionate 
                                                 
18 Ibid at 143. 
19 Ibid at 168. 
20 Ibid at 140. Lewans, supra note 10 at 559. 
21 It also plays a part in the limited role of legitimate expectations in administrative law. 
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discretion) permitting her to remain in Canada.22  She was denied H&C on the basis 
of a recommendation from an immigration officer who disparaged her for receiving 
social assistance, bearing several children, working as a “domestic”, and exhibiting 
mental illness.  Her children did not count – or, more accurately, did not count in her 
favour; she was derided for having so many of them. Unlike Roncarelli, she could not 
invoke her civil citizenship, or the indignity of being treated as a second-class citizen 
because she was not a citizen at all. Indeed, she was utterly precarious, since she did 
not even possess any of the lesser, conditional statuses assigned to migrants under 
Canadian law – permanent resident, temporary foreign worker, international student, 
visitor, etc.  All Mavis Baker had going for her was that she was a person, that she was 
here, and that she had children in Canada.    
 
And yet, that was enough. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé built upon Justice Rand’s 
judgment in two ways.  First, Baker re-articulates the principle that discretion is always 
bounded and informed by law – not just the statute, but also the common law, 
international law, and the Charter.23  This principle was not dependent on the sphere 
of government regulation, and so Justice L’Heureux-Dubé could deploy it in the 
service of humanitarian and compassionate discretion in immigration law.  Secondly, 
as noted above, Justice Rand’s focus on the impact of licence revocation on “vital 
interests” of the licence holder provided a counterweight to the ephemeral, contingent 
nature of a privilege from the state’s perspective. This shift in perspective runs from 
Roncarelli, through the recognition in Nicholson v Halidman-Norfolk24 that even the 
loss of probationary employment can have drastic consequences, and reaches the 
impact of deportation on someone whose residence in Canada was entirely outside the 
law. On its best reading, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s judgment transposes the rule of 
law’s concern from Roncarelli the citizen to Baker the human.   
 
Baker validated the non-citizen as a legal subject to whom the state is 
accountable via the rule of law. This should not have been news, but it was.  It should 
not have been news because the rule of law defines its sphere of application self-
referentially:  the rule of law encompasses those ruled by law. The limiting concept 
for the rule of law is jurisdiction (the reach of law), not citizenship (the status of those 
subject to law). So, of course the rule of law extends to non-citizens. Even Dicey 
thought so: he famously created a hypothetical of “foreign anarchists” suspected of 
(what would now be labeled) terrorism to advance his defence of habeas corpus. 25 
                                                 
22 Technically, she sought the favourable exercise of humanitarian and compassionate discretion to remain 
in Canada while applying for permanent resident status but in practical terms, a successful H&C application 
assured PR status. 
23 Lewans, supra note 10 at 560. 
24 Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional Municipality) Commissioners of Police [1979] 1 SCR 311, 88 
DLR (3d) 671.  Nicholson concerned entitlement to procedural fairness in a decision to dismiss a 
probationary constable. One might understand a probationary position as a category of employment 
analogous to a “privilege”. 
25 AV Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885) 
at 239. 
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So far, I have recited a fairly cheery story about non-citizens and the rule of 
law. But now I want to probe more deeply into how the specificity of the immigration 
context often seems to weaken the adhesive that binds the executive to the rule of law. 
My examples are ordinary compared to more dramatic post-9/11 laws, policies, and 
practices that infringed the Charter rights of non-citizens in the name of security. I 
choose my examples precisely because they are routine, because immigration 
exceptionalism is not so exceptional. I will speak only of Canada, but variations of the 
same story can be told in all common law countries. 
 
Let me introduce this counter narrative by directing attention to another facet 
of the Baker case. Recall that one of the traditional attributes of the rule of law is that 
no legislator can enact a law that completely precludes access to judicial review of an 
administrative decision. No privative clause purporting to oust judicial review, no 
matter how well-crafted or comprehensive, will thwart a court.  Except in immigration 
law, it seems. Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act26 and its predecessor, 
the Immigration Act,27 no decision rendered under the authority of that statute is 
judicially reviewable unless a judge of the Federal Court grants leave to seek judicial 
review: 
 
72 (1) Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter — a 
decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised 
— under this Act is,… commenced by making an application for leave to 
the Court.28 
 
The difference between a privative clause and a leave requirement is that in the former, 
the legislator attempts to directly preclude access to judicial review. In the latter, 
legislation deputizes a judge to act as gatekeeper. There are no statutory criteria for 
granting leave to seek judicial review. Federal Court jurisprudence provides limited 
guidance, stating that leave should be granted where there is a fairly or reasonably 
arguable case, or a serious issue to be tried.29  This apparently generous standard, 
however, bumps up against a culture of suspicion typified by the view expressed by 
one Federal Court judge that applications for leave are “made in many cases without 
any merit, merely to secure further delays so the applications for leave should not be 
lightly granted.”30 Judges are not required to provide reasons for denying leave.   
 
One might contend that the leave requirement does not deny access to the 
ordinary courts, because the judges who decide leave are judges in the ordinary courts. 
I am not persuaded that making judges the gatekeepers makes the process compliant 
with the rule of law.  What judges do by granting or denying leave to seek to judicial 
                                                 
26 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. 
27 Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976–77, c 52.  
28 IRPA, supra note 26 at s 72.  
29 See e.g. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2006 FC 1046, 151 ACWS (3d) 108; Level v Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 251, [2011] 3 FCR 60.  
30 Virk v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm LR (2d) 119 at para 3, 1991 
CarswellNat 34. 
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review is no more judicial review than the process of deciding a leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada is an appeal.  
 
Several years ago, Professor Sean Rehaag produced a careful and provocative 
empirical study of the leave process in refugee cases to the Federal Court,31 with 
disquieting results:  [f]irst, virtually all applications for leave were made by refused 
refugee claimants, and an average of only about 16% of leave applications were 
granted.32 Secondly, the leave-grant rates between Federal Court judges were wildly 
inconsistent.  Over a third of judges deviated more than 50% from the mean.33  Thirdly, 
judges who rarely granted leave were generally no better at picking cases that would 
ultimately succeed on judicial review than colleagues who frequently granted leave to 
seek judicial review.34  Indeed, almost 40% of cases that reached judicial review 
succeeded.35  In light of the erratic grant rates among judges, the high success rate on 
judicial review creates the disquieting concern that many of the 85% of applications 
denied leave might also have succeeded had they reached judicial review.36 
  
The justification for the leave requirement is obvious once one recognizes 
that the Federal Court is also a bureaucratic institution with a large caseload to manage.  
Like many large administrative bodies, it adopts mechanisms to reduce the burden. 
Lightening the judicial caseload was also one of the original justifications for privative 
clauses, albeit subsequent jurisprudence disabled privative clauses from performing 
this function37.  It is all the more jarring, of course, that access to first level judicial 
review – so fundamental to the rule of the law that the Supreme Court 
constitutionalized it – can be subordinated to the instrumental goals of judicial docket 
control via the leave requirement. Even so, immigration cases take up over 60% of the 
Federal Court’s docket.  One can sympathize with the predicament of an understaffed 
court with an overwhelming number of cases. 
 
A recent qualitative study that tracks 50 cases from Rehaag’s original dataset 
asks whether “effectiveness of legal representation and the strength or weakness of the 
underlying refugee claim”38 operate as factors explaining the low leave grant rates.  
This important research may shed light on the proportion of leave applications that 
appear to be made for tactical reasons (since the cases have no discernible merit), and 
                                                 
31 Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1 Queen's 
LJ 1.  
32 See Rehaag, ibid at 24, 52–53 (Table 2) and 58 (Table 7). 
33 Ibid at 27. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid at 58. 
36 Ibid at 23. 
37 Other motives for privative clauses include promotion of expeditious resolution of disputes and skepticism 
about the capacity or willingness of courts to respect the policy goals animating the legislative scheme. 
38 Pia Zambelli et al., “Not Just the Luck of the Draw?: Exploring Competency of Counsel as a Factor in 
Federal Court Leave Determinations in Refugee Cases (2005-2010)” [unpublished manuscript on file with 
author]. 
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on the proportion of otherwise meritorious refugee claims are denied leave to seek 
judicial review because of poorly prepared leave applications. But even if this 
qualitative research demonstrates that both factors play a role in explaining why almost 
85% of leave applications are denied, it cannot account for the dramatic disparity in 
leave grant rates between judges, or explain the absence of a correlation between leave 
grant rate and success on judicial review. And finally, the failure to articulate 
meaningful criteria for leave decisions, whether through guidelines or reasons, means 
that the leave process is a discretionary decision that remains opaque and 
unaccountable within the framework of a “culture of justification.”  Even if one 
countenances a legitimate role for a leave requirement, it seems hard to imagine that 
the current system actually meets any plausible conception of the rule of law’s 
guarantee of access to the ordinary courts. 
 
This system of requiring leave to seek judicial review only applies to 
decisions taken under immigration law.  Non-citizens – and only non-citizens – must 
ask permission to enter the Federal Court.  Gates, boundaries, borders, and exclusion 
are familiar to many non-citizens, and the leave requirement is only a juridical 
incarnation. Mavis Baker was fortunate that an unnamed judge granted leave to seek 
judicial review in her case.  But on average, for every Mavis Baker who gets her day 
in court, another six do not.  We cannot confidently conclude that the cases of those 
six people lacked merit. 
 
 
III.  Borderline Law 
 
I turn now to a case study that figured in the headlines in 2017-18: the irregular entry 
of asylum seekers into Canada across the Canada-US border at a place other than a 
designated port of entry (POE). The vast majority enter Quebec, and a few have 
crossed into Manitoba and British Columbia, sometimes under extremely harsh 
weather conditions. Some border crossers suffered frostbite and lost fingers. From 
January 2017 to July 2018, about 31 400 people crossed the border irregularly and 
made refugee claims in Canada.39  About a third of irregular entrants in 2017 were 
from Haiti, followed by Turkey, Nigeria, Eritrea, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Djibouti.40 
In 2018, the relative and absolute number of Nigerian entrants increased, though by 
mid-2018, overall numbers of irregular entrants were declining. 
 
The media has repeatedly referred to the phenomenon as “illegal border 
crossing” and characterized border crossers as exploiting a “loophole” in the Canada-
US Safe Third Country Agreement. I interpret “loophole” here to mean a gap in a legal 
                                                 
39 See RCMP interceptions for 2017 at Government of Canada, “2017 Asylum Claims” (15 June 2018), 
Refugees and Asylum, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/services/refugees/asylum-claims-2017.html>; For RCMP interceptions in 2018, see 
Government of Canada, “Asylum Claims” (19 July 2018), Refugees and Asylum, online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/asylum-claims.html>. 
40 UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, Doc, “Irregular Crossings at The Border: Challenging Myths and 
Preconceptions” (16 April 2018), online: UNHCR <https://www.unhcr.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/PressBackgrounder-Border-En-25April-website-size.pdf>. 
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regime that enables (or fails to prohibit) conduct by a person that contravenes the spirit 
or larger purpose of the law. These border crossers thus represent a law enforcement 
problem, underscored by attaching the label “illegal” to them.  In what follows, I want 
to flip that narrative by suggesting that the legal regime operating upon those border 
crossers raises serious concerns about the exercise of state power beyond the bounds 
of its lawful authority. In other words, it is a rule of law problem. 
 
Since 2017, not long after US President Donald Trump was sworn into office, 
people began crossing into Canada from the United States at unmarked border 
crossings and asking for refugee protection. This procession of people was odd: 
clearly, the border crossers did not wish to present themselves to a Canadian Border 
Services Agency (CBSA) officer at a designated port of entry to ask for refugee 
protection. Yet, neither did they attempt to enter clandestinely. Adults, some with 
children, walked across the border in broad daylight, under the watchful eyes of the 
media and directly into the chilly embrace of RCMP, who warned them not to enter 
Canada and then promptly arrested them when they do. A few crossed in the winter, 
across a frozen field near Emerson, Manitoba.  Frostbite cost some men their fingers,41 
and a woman died from exposure.42  But the overwhelming majority have entered at 
Roxham Road, Quebec, the site of a former designated port of entry that closed several 
years ago. 
 
The explanation for the sudden phenomenon of irregular border crossing lies 
with US politics, the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), and the UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.43  The Canada-US border spans about 
6500 kilometers from east to west, not including the Canada-Alaska boundary.  
Sprinkled across that terrain are a handful of designated ports of entry – border posts 
staffed by Canadian Border Services Agency on the Canadian side and Customs and 
Border Protection on the US side. In between there is the notional line dividing the 
two countries and little else. The Canada-US border is not secured by a wall, by 
sentries or (so far) by hovering drones, but by the sheer good fortune that both Canada 
and the United States are generally decent enough places to live that few feel a 
desperate need to leave one country for the other. And if they do want to leave, 
temporarily or permanently, they have reasonable confidence that the ordinary 
channels available to them under each state’s respective immigration laws will enable 
them to do so.   
 
 
                                                 
41 Austin Grabish, “Frostbitten refugee will lose fingers, toe after 7-hour trek to cross U.S.-Canada border”, 
CBC News (11 January 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/refugees-frostbite-
manitoba-1.3930146>. 
42 Laura Glowacki, “Asylum agreement with U.S. to blame for woman's death near border, lawyer says”, 
CBC News (31 May 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/safe-third-countries-border-
crosser-death-1.4140348>. 
43 For the origins of the expression, see Etienne Mureinik, “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill 
of Rights” (1994) 10:1 SAJHR 31 at 32; and David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik's 
Conception of Legal Culture” (1998) 14:1 SAJHR 11 at 11–12.  
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All states – including Canada – subscribe to the view that their sovereignty 
subsists in their power to control their borders, admit whom they like, and reject those 
they do not. Canada is more insulated by its geography than is the United States, and 
Canada also expends considerable resources on extraterritorial mechanisms for 
deterring and deflecting non-citizens before they reach Canadian soil.   
 
Another important difference between Canada and the United States is the legal 
regulation of irregular border crossing.  United States law regards irregular entry as a 
criminal offence: 
 
Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time 
or place other than as designated by immigration officers, … shall, for the 
first commission of any such offense, be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned 
not more than 6 months, or both, and, for a subsequent commission of any 
such offense, be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, 
or both.44 
  
In Canada, breaches of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are not 
criminalized, although they are regulatory offences that can carry a penalty:    
 
124 (1) Every person commits an offence who 
(a) contravenes a provision of this Act for which a penalty is not specifically 
provided or fails to comply with a condition or obligation imposed under 
this Act;45 
125 A person who commits an offence under subsection 124(1) is liable 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine of not more than $50,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or to both; or 
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.46 
 
One might reasonably assume that entering Canada by walking across an unofficial 
border crossing contravenes a provision of IRPA. Indeed, this sign at Roxham Road, 
Quebec, the crossing point for thousands of people since 2017, seems to confirm that: 
 
 
                                                 
44 8 USC § 1325. 
45 IRPA, supra note 26 at s 124. 
46 Ibid at s 125. 
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Sign at the Roxham Road border 
 
The sign is not wrong, but it is misleading.  In fact, the IRPA does not restrict people 
to only entering Canada at a designated port of entry.   Most people are expected to –
and do – enter Canada via a designated port of entry by air, sea or land, so labelling 
entries outside of ports of entry as “irregular” makes sense. But is it unlawful to enter 
irregularly? The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations47 states:  
 
27(2) … a person who seeks to enter Canada at a place other than a port of 
entry must appear without delay for examination at the port of entry that is 
nearest to that place.48  
 
This means that Canada’s immigration law does not prohibit entering Canada via an 
unmarked border crossing.  Irregular entry breaches immigration law only if the person 
does not thereafter “appear without delay for examination” at the closest designated 
port of entry.49 Irregular entry is not, as such, an unlawful entry. Since almost all 
irregular border crossers enter in the presence of the RCMP, and the RCMP 
immediately detain and transfer them to a CBSA officer at a nearby port of entry for 
examination, these border crossers have not violated s. 27(2) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Regulations.  
 
The foregoing applies to any would-be entrant to Canada, but refugees benefit 
from an additional exemption even if their entry actually was unlawful. The source is 
                                                 
47 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227.  
48 Ibid at s 27(2).  
49 See e.g. R v Campbell, 2000 BCSC 956, 6 Imm LR (3d) 1. An Indigenous US citizen entered Canada 
through an unmarked border crossing in order to visit a hereditary chief in British Columbia. He did not 
report to an immigration officer, and was convicted for failing to do so. He unsuccessfully argued that he 
was asserted an aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution.  
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the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).50 Canada 
ratified in 1969 by signing the Optional Protocol; the United States did so in 1968. 
 
Canadian law incorporates the definition of a refugee contained in the 
Refugee Convention as:    
 
a person who by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion,  
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by 
reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of each 
of those countries, or 
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside their country of former 
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to 
return to that country.51 
 
The Refugee Convention obliges a State Party to protect a person who arrives at its 
borders and meets the definition of a refugee. The immediate legal consequence of 
refugee status is protection from refoulement – expulsion to the person’s country of 
nationality.  Once recognized as a refugee – or a “person in need of protection” under 
the IRPA, refugees may embark on a path to permanent residence and, ultimately, 
citizenship. 
 
All states – including Canada – chafe under the obligations of the Refugee 
Convention.  Canada receives a trivial number of asylum seekers compared to states 
closer to refugee-producing regions, but any increase from the status quo triggers 
melodramatic marine metaphors of “waves,” “floods,” and “surges”. States regard 
people arriving spontaneously as threats to sovereignty, even though asylum seekers 
behave exactly as the Refugee Convention anticipates they will, and states who signed 
the Refugee Convention did so of their free sovereign will. Asylum seekers do no more 
than ask states to fulfill their voluntarily assumed obligations.   
 
Of course, not everyone who claims asylum necessarily meets the definition 
of a refugee, but one cannot determine that in advance of a refugee determination 
process, which in Canada is performed by the Immigration and Refugee Board.  
 
Front line states that are adjacent to conflict zones may not be able to resist 
the mass influx of people fleeing war, natural disaster and violence, but states that are 
geographically remote have more options, and many arguably breach their 
international legal obligations in exercising them. Like virtually all states, Canada 
strives to minimize the number of asylum seekers who reach its borders.  Having ocean 
on two sides, the Arctic to the north and the United States to the south has already 
insulated Canada from asylum seekers more than most countries of the world. Canada 
is far away from refugee producing regions and it is hard to reach. Yet, successive 
                                                 
50 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 
1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969) [Refugee Convention].  
51 IRPA, supra note 26 at s 96.  
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governments have continued to explore ways to seal Canada off even more effectively, 
on the basis that the Refugee Convention’s prohibition on expelling refugees to face 
persecution (refoulement) does not preclude states from doing everything possible to 
prevent them from arriving in the first place.  
 
The most basic and ubiquitous barrier facing asylum seekers is the visa 
requirement, which certifies permission to enter and must be obtained in 
advance of arrival. This is the main tool against spontaneous arrival, but 
citizens of wealthy industrial states of the global north are exempt from the 
visa requirement. Their spontaneous arrival is not regarded as a menace to 
sovereignty.  
 
There are many types of visas and most people from most countries of the 
world require one as prerequisite to entry. Entering Canada without a required visa is 
an offence under Canadian immigration law. As a matter of explicit policy, Canada 
imposes visa requirements on nationals from countries known to produce refugees, 
and then systematically refuses to issue visas to citizens of those states.  Canada also 
posts immigration “integrity officers” to foreign airports who scrutinize and 
peremptorily deny boarding to travelers with allegedly suspicious travel documents, 
and deputizes airline officials to do the same.  The IRPA also imposes carrier sanctions 
on airlines and shipping countries that transport improperly documented migrants to 
Canada. Because these tools operate beyond Canada’s borders, the legal violence of 
exclusion from Canada is less visible but no less real than the physical violence 
observable at, for instance, the US border with Mexico. The net result is that it is 
virtually impossible for asylum seekers to lawfully travel to Canada to seek refugee 
protection.52  
 
It is not news that refugees, in desperation, resort to irregular means of travel 
and entry, using smugglers, fake visas, or clandestine entry. The drafters of the 
Refugee Convention knew this, and so inserted the following provision into Article 31 
of the Refugee Convention: 
 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees, who, coming directly from a territory where 
their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are 
present in their territory without authorization, provided they present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their 
illegal entry or presence. 
 
Section 17 the Regulations partially mirrors this provision by ensuring that irregular 
entry is not a breach of the IRPA unless the person fails to present themselves to 
authorities without delay. Canada also implements this international obligation via s. 
                                                 
52 As a response to the irregular crossing of Nigerian nationals from the US to Canada in 2018, the Canadian 
Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship urged the United States to cease issuing US visitor visas 
to Nigerians.  This suggests that Canada is more restrictive in its visa policies than the US, at least regarding 
Nigeria. See e.g. Ingrid Piritz & Michelle Zilio, “Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen to visit Nigeria to 
try to contain flow of asylum claimants”, The Globe and Mail (7 May 2018), online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-immigration-minister-ahmed-hussen-to-visit-nigeria-
to-try-to-contain/ >.   
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133 of the IRPA, which prevents a person who makes a refugee claim from being 
charged with an offence under s. 124(1)(a) pending disposition of their refugee claim: 
 
133 A person who has claimed refugee protection, and who came to Canada 
directly or indirectly from the country in respect of which the claim is made, 
may not be charged with an offence under section 122, paragraph 124(1)(a) 
or section 127 of this Act or under section 57, paragraph 340(c) or section 
354, 366, 368, 374 or 403 of the Criminal Code, in relation to the coming 
into Canada of the person, pending disposition of their claim for refugee 
protection or if refugee protection is conferred.53 
 
Under Canadian law, asylum seekers who arrive at a port of entry and make a refugee 
claim will typically be inadmissible to Canada because they do not have the required 
visa. But refugee claimants without valid visas are conditionally admitted to Canada 
in order to determine whether they are refugees. If they are declared as refugees 
(protected persons), they will not be charged with entering without a visa.54  If they 
are not found to be refugees, they will not likely be charged anyway, but simply 
removed from Canada as someone who is inadmissible to Canada for entering without 
a visa. The same principle applies to someone who enters at an unmarked border 
crossing and fails to proceed to a designated port of entry without delay. Note, 
however, the epistemic lag: one cannot know whether the entry was unlawful at the 
time of entry; its legality depends on the subsequent outcome of the refugee 
determination process.   
 
What I have just described is how the system worked up to 2004, and how it 
works today at airports, maritime ports, or at Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship 
offices all over Canada. It works this way everywhere except at designated ports of 
entry along the Canada-US border. In the years prior to 2004, many refugee claimants 
– about 30-40% – entered Canada at designated POE at the Canada/US border.55 They 
came via the United States for a few reasons: first, the United States is more accessible 
than Canada for many asylum seekers.  They may have travelled overland from Central 
or South America, or flown into the United States. The reasons why some subset of 
asylum seekers entering the US ultimately sought refugee protection in Canada rather 
than the US were diverse, and ranged from the presence of kin or community in 
Canada, or the belief that Canada would be more likely to extend refugee protection 
than the United States. Over the years, Canada’s asylum recognition rate has 
fluctuated, but it would be an error to assume that in the years since 2004, it has always 
or even usually been significantly higher. Nevertheless, certain kinds of refugee 
claims, such as those based on gender-related persecution, have garnered greater 
recognition in Canada than the United States. 
 
                                                 
53 IRPA, supra note 26 at s 133.  
54 See e.g. United States v Redha, 2003 MBQB 153 at paras 29–30, [2003] 11 WWR 707.  
55 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Closing the Front Door on Refugees” (December 2005), online: 
<http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/closingdoordec05.pdf>. 
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The Canadian government had long sought a way to reduce the number of 
asylum seekers reaching the Canadian border via the United States.56 In 2004, 
following European precedent, Canada persuaded the US to enter into what is now 
known as the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement. It requires asylum seekers 
to make their refugee claim in the first country of arrival as between the United States 
and Canada. The Agreement says that if a person on the US side of the border seeks 
to make a refugee claim in Canada, that person will be deflected back to the United 
States, and vice versa. This is expressed in the STCA as authority by Canada or the 
United States to return a person to the country of last presence. Country of last 
presence, in turn, is defined in the STCA as “that country, being either Canada or the 
United States, in which the refugee claimant was physically present immediately prior 
to making a refugee status claim at a land border port of entry.”57 Though the 
Agreement is reciprocal, the flow of asylum seekers at the Canada-US border has 
disproportionately flowed from south to north. One reason is that it is generally easier 
to enter the United States. In the year prior to the Agreement, about 14,000 asylum 
seekers came through the US to Canada; about 200 went the other way.58 The practical 
aim of the Agreement was to reduce the number of asylum seekers entering Canada 
by deflecting them back to the United States.   
 
Recall that the Refugee Convention prohibits Canada from expelling a 
refugee to a place where he or she faces a well-founded fear of persecution. But the 
Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement permits Canada to avoid inquiring into 
whether an asylum seeker is a refugee (and thereby protected) by deflecting that person 
back to the United States, which then assumes responsibility for refugee 
determination. The legality of this reciprocal agreement hinges on a political judgment 
that refugees should seek protection in the first country they reach that provides an 
accessible, fair, human rights compliant refugee determination process, and that both 
Canada and the United States meet that standard. The first state (Canada) cannot deport 
a refugee claimant to a second state (the country of nationality) without first 
adjudicating their refugee claim according to a fair, human rights respecting process, 
but it can send the refugee claimant to a third country (United States) by agreement.  
 
Section 159.4 of the Regulations explicitly state that the Canada-US STCA 
does not extend to airports, marine ports, and locations that are not ports of entry. This 
was a deliberate decision, not an oversight or “loophole” accidentally left unfilled.59 
                                                 
56 For an analysis of the 2004 Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement, see Audrey Macklin, 
“Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement” (2005) 36:2 Colum 
HRLR 365 [Disappearing Refugees].  
57 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America For 
cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third countries, United States and 
Canada, 5 December 2002, Can TS 2004 No 2 art 1, s 1(a) (entered into force 29 December 2004) [STCA]. 
58  See STCA, supra note 57 and US, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, 
and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 107th Cong (Washington, DC: 
2002) at 69, 78, online: 
<http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju82363.000/hju82363_0.HTM>.  
59 See Zhao v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1384 at para 17, 
2015 CarswellNat 10516.  In this case, the Refugee Appeal Division declined to hear an appeal because its 
members felt that those who enter irregularly should not be “‘given an advantage […] over other claimants 
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The reasons for confining the STCA to the land ports of entry are pragmatic:  
deflection at an air or maritime port can only work if commercial airline carriers and 
ships agree to re-transport people who are physically coerced back to where they 
embarked and the countries of embarkation agree to re-admit them. Commercial 
carriers refused to cooperate in this enterprise.    
 
As for applying the STCA across the full length of the land border, the 2002 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration considered and 
rejected this option for several reasons. First, applying the Canada-US STCA along 
the entire land border would create incentives for surreptitious entry across a border. 
Vigilantly surveilling the entire border seems neither feasible nor desirable. Some 
border crossers, seeking to evade detection, would adopt hazardous routes and get 
injured or die. Others would succeed in entering and make refugee claims inland at 
immigration offices, at which point it would be difficult (if not impossible) to 
determine how they entered Canada. The Committee referred to the failure of the 
inland application of the European Union’s multi-lateral safe third country regime (the 
Dublin Regulation):  
 
some countries had to establish time-consuming and costly processes for 
inland claims. It is understandable that the government would like to avoid 
diverting resources to a procedure intended to establish the inland 
claimants’ route to Canada, rather than using that time and money to 
actually decide their refugee claims.60  
 
These predictable impediments have not deterred some politicians from calling for the 
government to designate the entire land border a “port of entry”.61 A close reading of 
the IRPA suggests that the proposition is unintelligible within the existing statutory 
framework, but the demand for it helpfully exposes the discrepancy between border as 
place and bordering as practice. 
 
The border of cartographic imagery, the line that separates two geo-political 
patches of territory, is two-dimensional.  That is to say, the border is immaterial. One 
is either on one side of it (and in country X) or on the other side of it (and in country 
Y). Walls, fences, and ditches purport to impede movement from one side to another, 
but they are not thresholds. An official port of entry performs the distinct and vital task 
of creating an infrastructure of liminality where states can assert governance of and at 
the border. A port of entry has an entry and an exit, and between those two portals lies, 
in functional terms, a thickened border.  It is a fiction, of course, made more obvious 
                                                 
who respect and observe Canada’s border control laws’.” The Federal Court disagreed with RAD, citing the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement that acknowledged irregular entry was a possibility envisaged by the 
government: “‘An increase in refugee claims at inland offices and airports may result as persons seek to 
bypass the provisions of the Act and Regulations. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) is developing 
operational contingency strategies to prepare for these impacts and will reallocate resources as required.’” 
See also Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, (2004) 138 C Gaz II, 1624. 
60 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, The Safe Third Country 
Regulations: Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (December 2002) at 10 
(Chair: Joe Fontana) [STCA Regulations].  
61 House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 284 (24 Apr 2018) at 1020 (Michelle Rempel). 
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by the operation of ports of entry at airports, which are indisputably within state 
territory.  Ports of entry must be understood less as fixed locations than as part of the 
process of bordering, which happens inside state territory, extraterritorially, wherever 
biometric data can be stored, retrieved, and shared, as well as along the jurisdictional 
boundary we conventionally understand as “the” border. 
 
When the STCA authorizes border officials of either state to return an asylum 
seeker to “the country, being either Canada or the United States, in which the refugee 
claimant was physically present immediately prior to making a refugee status claim at 
a land border port of entry,” it presupposes that the asylum seeker is, at that moment, 
making a refugee claim in a space that is neither Canada nor the United States. Other 
provisions of the immigration legislation make it clear that designated ports of entry 
are spaces in which immigration officials are present and able to perform various 
functions, such as examination for purposes of entry (IRPA s. 27) or acceptance of an 
application to renounce permanent resident status (IRPA s. 46(1.1)).  
 
Ports of entry create a contained space that operates as a legal threshold, and 
populates it with state officials. But between ports of entry, this infrastructure does not 
exist. There is no place and no authorized officer present to which one could address 
a refugee claim.62  By logical necessity, the refugee claimant who crosses from the US 
to Canada between ports of entry is always already physically present in Canada 
immediately prior to making her refugee status claim. Canada is her country of last 
presence under the STCA, not the United States. The STCA does not authorize the 
return to the US of a claimant who is already in Canada when she makes her refugee 
claim. This is the consequence of how borders are materialized through physical and 
human infrastructure in order to enable states to perform the functions of inclusion and 
exclusion of goods and people.  
 
Having said this, it is something of a distraction to focus on whether the entire 
Canada-US land border could be deemed a port of entry, or whether the exchange of 
biometric data might better expose asylum seekers who transited through the US en 
route to Canada63.  The dilemma posed by the irregular entry of asylum seekers is not 
a technical problem of how to better detect which asylum seekers transited through the 
United States in order to return them there. It is a rule of law problem: can Canada 
continue to lawfully deflect the entry of asylum seekers at designated ports of entry 
under the terms of the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement?   
 
                                                 
62 The RCMP who intercept irregular border crossers eventually deliver them to CBSA officers at a port of 
entry, where asylum seekers formally ask for refugee protection. 
63 In June 2018, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration proposed “modernizing” the STCA through 
the exchange of biometric data with the United States that would purportedly enable Canadian officials to 
determine whether an asylum seeker had been in the United States prior to Canada. This would presumably 
resolve the problem of determining how asylum seekers who apply at an inland office originally entered 
Canada. See Teresa Wright, “Hussen floats ideas to modernize Safe Third Country Agreement with U.S.”, 
CBC News (29 May 2018), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ahmed-hussen-modernize-agreement-
1.4682962>. 
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The question matters because the alleged safety of the United States is the 
predicate and the justification for what is otherwise a breach of Canada’s international 
legal obligations under the Refugee Convention. Commentators who describe 
irregular border crossers as taking advantage of a loophole in the Canada-US Safe 
Third Country Agreement have it exactly backwards. As noted earlier, the fact that 
people who seek refugee protection use irregular means to enter does not make their 
entry unlawful under immigration law if they subsequently succeed in their refugee 
claim. Far from exploiting a loophole, they behave exactly as the drafters of the 
Refugee Convention and Canadian law predict they will.   
 
The only thing that has changed is that until 2004, refugee claimants rarely 
resorted to irregular border crossings because they could simply present themselves to 
CBSA officers at a designated port of entry and ask Canada for refugee protection in 
an orderly, efficient, and safe manner. Now they cannot. The Canada-US Safe Third 
Country Agreement exploits an ambiguity in the UN Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, which imposes on states a legal obligation not to refoule a refugee to a 
country where he or she faces persecution, but is silent about states’ evading their 
obligation by deflecting asylum seekers to a third country. One might say that Canada 
(inspired by EU precedent) found a loophole in international refugee law and filled it 
with the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement64.   
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not object to the 
Canada-US STCA in 2004. Article 8(3) of the STCA required Canada and the United 
States to produce a review of STCA implementation within the first twelve months. In 
that context, the UNHCR provided a monitoring report in 2006 that examined the 
impact of the STCA on asylum seekers subject to it, namely those arriving at 
designated port of entry along the Canada-US border. The project involved two 
protection consultants, a schedule of monitoring activities (included in the report), and 
specific objectives agreed upon and communicated to the parties. While noting various 
flaws, the UNHCR monitoring report refrained from serious criticism of either Canada 
or the United States regarding the safety of their respective refugee determination 
systems.65  
 
In response to the increase in irregular crossings in 2017, the UNHCR 
representative in Canada has observed the conduct of Canadian authorities toward 
asylum seekers who cross into Canada outside official border crossings. Unlike the 
asylum seekers observed in the 2006 UNHCR report, irregular border crossers are not 
subject to the STCA.  There has been no replication of the STCA monitoring project 
undertaken by the UNHCR in the first 12 months of the STCA.  Nor has the UNHCR 
publicly disclosed any subsequent monitoring reports about STCA conformity with 
international refugee law.  
                                                 
64 Audrey Macklin, “A Safe Country to Emulate? Canada and the European Refugee”, Hélène Lambert, 
Jane McAdam & Maryellen Fullerton, eds, The Global Reach of European Refugee Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press Online, 2014), 99–131. 
65 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Monitoring Report, “Canada - United States ‘Safe 
Third Country’ Agreement 29 December 2004 – 28 December 2005” (June 2006), online: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/home/PROTECTION/455b2cca4.pdf>. 
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According to the Canadian Representative of the UNHCR, his US 
counterpart confines the UNHCR’s limited monitoring resources to the busier 
southern US border with Mexico.66  The inference I draw is that neither the UNHCR 
in Canada nor in the United States directly monitors the treatment of asylum seekers 
returned from Canada to the US, nor United States’ compliance with the criteria for 
designation as a safe third country within the meaning of the STCA.   
 
In 2008, the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Council of 
Churches, Amnesty International, and an unnamed Colombian refugee claimant (John 
Doe) challenged the legality of the STCA.67 The main argument was that the United 
States was not, in fact, a safe country for asylum seekers to obtain a fair, human rights 
compliant refugee determination process.  By designating the United States as safe for 
purposes of rendering refugee claimants ineligible to seek protection in Canada, the 
Governor in Council (Cabinet) violated the provisions in the IRPA authorizing it to 
designate a third country as safe if it met stipulated criteria.  
 
102. (1) The regulations may … for the purpose of sharing responsibility 
with governments of foreign states for the consideration of refugee claims, 
may include provisions 
 
(a) designating countries that comply with Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture; 
(b) making a list of those countries and amending it as necessary; and 
(c) respecting the circumstances and criteria for the application of paragraph 
101(1)(e). 
 
(2) The following factors are to be considered in designating a country 
under paragraph (1)(a): 
(a) whether the country is a party to the Refugee Convention and to the 
Convention Against Torture; 
(b) its policies and practices with respect to claims under the Refugee 
Convention and with respect to obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture; 
(c) its human rights record; and 
(d) whether it is party to an agreement with the Government of Canada for 
the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee 
protection. 
 
The challenge succeeded before the Federal Court.68 Justice Phelan ruled in 
favour of the applicants, finding that the United States was not a safe third country 
because its policies and practices with respect to refugee claims did not actually 
comply with its obligations under UN Refugee Convention and the Convention Against 
                                                 
66 Email correspondence with Jean-Nicolas Beuze, United Nations High Commissioner Representative for 
Canada, 5 June 2018 [on file with author]. 
67 See Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2007 FC 1262, 69 Imm LR (3d) 163 and Canadian Council for 
Refugees v R, 2008 FCA 229, 73 Imm LR (3d) 159. For a thoughtful critique of the judgments, see Efrat 
Arbel, “Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of Rights: Examining the Safe Third Country Agreement 
between Canada and the United States” (2013) 25:1 Intl J Refugee L 65. 
68 Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2007 FC 1262, supra note 67.  
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Torture to not refoule refugees to persecution or torture. Therefore, the Governor in 
Council acted unreasonably in designating the US a safe country to seek refugee status. 
In addition, the Governor in Council violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights in Freedoms in so doing.   
 
The Federal Court of Appeal overturned the Federal Court decision primarily 
on administrative grounds.69 The Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the Justice Phelan 
erred in thinking that the US’ actual compliance with the UN Refugee Convention and 
the Convention Against Torture mattered to the legality of the Cabinet’s designation.  
According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the IRPA only required Cabinet to consider 
the statutorily required factors in s.102(2). Having considered the factors, Cabinet 
fulfilled its statutory duty. 
 
In the Federal Court of Appeal’s opinion: 
 
Once it is accepted, as it must be in this case, that the GIC has given due 
consideration to these four factors, and formed the opinion that the 
candidate country is compliant with the relevant Articles of the 




It follows that the fact that the respondents believe, and that the Applications 
judge agreed, that the U.S. does not "actually" comply is irrelevant since 
this was not the issue that the Applications judge was called upon to decide 
[…]. 71 
 
One way of understanding the difference between the approach of the Federal Court 
of Appeal and the Federal Court is to align them with Justice Cartwright and Justice 
Rand respectively in Roncarelli v Duplessis. Recall that I described Justice Cartwright 
as measuring the legality of the exercise of discretion from the perspective of the state: 
a liquor licence is a privilege that remains within the discretion of the state to grant, 
withhold or withdraw, and if the statute places no restrictions on the exercise of 
discretion, then no limits exist. Roncarelli has no right to the licence, and he has no 
right to complain about its revocation.  Justice Rand adopts the perspective of the legal 
subject, and takes into account the import of the licence and the impact of its 
cancellation on the holder. Roncarelli may not have a right to a liquor licence, but 
denying it to him inflicts serious injury to his livelihood and so the discretion to 
withdraw his liquor licence must be exercised in a principled, non-arbitrary way. 
 
In the STCA case, the IRPA does stipulate criteria relevant to the exercise of 
discretion.  But for the Federal Court of Appeal, what the statute requires of Cabinet 
is only that they consider those factors; neither the rigour of the consideration nor the 
outcome matter.  In other words, the impact of the designation of the United States as 
                                                 
69 Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2008 FCA 229, supra note 67.  
70 Ibid at para 78. 
71 Ibid at para 80. 
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a safe country for asylum seekers is formally irrelevant to the legality of the 
designation. The Federal Court, however, proceeds from the position that the statute 
requires and authorizes the court to inquire into whether the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the United States is a safe third country. Why?  Because if Cabinet 
certifies the United States as a safe country when it is not, an asylum seeker returned 
from Canada to the United States may unfairly be denied refugee protection by the 
United States and refouled to face persecution in their country of nationality. In short, 
the impact on refugees will be catastrophic. The Supreme Court of Canada denied 
leave to appeal in the Safe Third Country Agreement litigation in 2009.72   
 
When the STCA was implemented, I predicted an increase in irregular entry 
of asylum seekers to Canada.73 This did not materialize over the next dozen years, and 
so it seemed I was wrong.  Perhaps asylum seekers did not perceive the United States 
as an unsafe country to seek refugee protection, or at least not unsafe enough to warrant 
the hazards of crossing irregularly into Canada. That changed in 2017. Donald Trump 
was elected as President of the United States in 2016 on a wave of xenophobic and 
anti-Muslim rhetoric and campaign promises. 
 
Irregular border crossing has rarely been an issue between Canada and the 
United States.  Ordinarily, numbers apprehended while crossing are small enough that 
they do not warrant media attention. But the number of irregular border crossers since 
2017 has been relatively high and counting entrants has been reasonably easy, because 


















                                                 
72 Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, Amnesty International and John Doe v 
Her Majesty the Queen, 2009 CanLII 4204 (SCC).  
73 See Macklin, Disappearing Refugees, supra note 56. 
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Asylum Claims and Interceptions Monthly Report - Calendar Year 2017/1874 
 
RCMP Interceptions 2017 RCMP Interceptions 2018 









Total –  
RCMP 
Jan 245 19 46 5 315 Jan 1458 18 41 0 1517 
Feb 452 142 84 0 678 Feb 1486 31 48 0 1565 
Mar 654 170 71 2 897 Mar 1884 53 33 0 1970 
Apr 672 146 32 9 859 Apr 2479 50 31 0 2560 
May 576 106 60 0 742 May 1775 36 53 5 1869 
Jun 781 63 39 1 884 Jun 1179 31 53 0 1263 
July 2996 87 51 0 3134       
Aug  5530 80 102 0 5712       
Sept  1720 78 79 4 1881       
Oct 1755 67 68 0 1890       
Nov 1539 38 46 0 1623       





1018 718 21 20 593 Total 
2018 
    10 744 
 
In the first six months of 2018, the RCMP apprehended approximately 10 
800 asylum seekers crossing from the US into Canada between designated ports of 
entry. As in 2017, over 95% crossed at Roxham Road, Quebec. 
  
When the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration studied the proposed Safe Third Country Agreement in 2002, witnesses 
warned of the risk that closing land ports of entry to asylum seekers would divert them 
to other entry points along the border. The Committee recognized “the fairly orderly 
system that now exists at Canada’s ports of entry, including the land border [where 
all] claimants are fingerprinted, photographed and issued instructions for medical 
examinations.” The Committee also acknowledged that “[t]his will, of course, not 
occur if people avoid reporting to border posts”. The spectacle of irregular border 
crossing could create a “public backlash” against refugees, because irregular entries 
“tend to create intolerance” – even though irregular entry is a direct result of barring 
access to regular entry.  In response to these concerns, the Committee recommended 
as follows: 
 
Should the Agreement fail to decrease the number of claims being referred 
to the Immigration and Refugee Board, and should an increase in the 
number of illegal entries to Canada be apparent, the government must be 
prepared to exercise its authority to suspend or terminate the Agreement.75 
 
Fifteen years later, the hypothetical became reality. Given the volume of people 
crossing the border between designated ports of entry in 2017, one might ask why the 
government did not simply suspend the STCA so that people could, as they did pre-
                                                 
74 See RCMP interceptions, supra note 39. 
75 STCA Regulations, supra note 60 at 10, and STCA, supra note 57 art 10 s 2–3. 
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2005, approach designated ports of entry and claim refugee status. This restoration of 
the status quo ante would avoid the disorder and inefficiency of intercepting and 
managing irregular crossings. In other words, why not heed the recommendation of 
the Committee in 2002? The answer does not lie in principle, or law, or evidence-
based policy, but in politics. The mediatized spectacle of migrants crossing irregularly 
imprints them with the stain of criminality, however wrong that may be in fact and in 
law. As long as they are cast as exploiting a ‘loophole’ in the Safe Third Country 
Agreement, suspending the STCA so asylum seekers can resume claiming refugee 
status at a designated port of entry will look like a concession rather than a solution.  
The distorted logic might be captured by this analogy: people cross the street at 
designated crosswalks.  One day, the law prohibits people wearing black from crossing 
the street at designated crosswalks.  People wearing black start crossing in the middle 
of the road between crosswalks and are labelled jaywalkers – illegal street-crossers.  
Reversing the law so that people wearing black can once again cross at the crosswalk 
is resisted because law breakers must be punished. Lawmakers cannot appear to be 
“capitulating” to illegality, even if they are reversing an irrational policy that 
manufactured illegality.  
 
In the meantime, the same public interest litigants who litigated the Safe 
Third Country Agreement a decade ago – along with different asylum seekers – are 
relitigating the legality of the Safe Third Country Agreement post-Trump. Since taking 
office in January 2017, President Trump has arguably supplemented and amplified 
support for the claim that the US is not a safe country for people to obtain refugee 
protection. Not all laws, policies, and practices adopted by his administration would 
directly affect all asylum seekers entering Canada, although they contribute to creating 
a climate of hostility, xenophobia, and vilification for non-citizens and Muslims – or 
anyone presumed to fit those categories.76 The Trump anti-immigration catalogue 
includes reversal of the Obama-era measures protecting “Dreamers”, the notorious 
“Muslim ban” on immigrants from Muslim majority states,77 resettlement of Muslim 
refugees, militarization of the southern border with the Mexico, increased powers to 
deport irregular migrants, and penalties for non-collaborating states and 
municipalities. Measures specifically targeting asylum seekers or people in refugee-
                                                 
76 During a White House meeting, Trump called immigrants “animals,” saying of those who seek to cross 
the border illegally: “These aren’t people, these are animals, and we’re taking them out of the country at a 
level and at a rate that’s never happened before.”  On many occasions, Trump has read a poem to compare 
immigrants and refugees to a “vicious snake.” He has also frequently referred to immigrants from Mexico 
as “rapists.” See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants ‘Animals’ in Rant”, 
The New York Times (16 May 2018), online: < https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/politics/trump-
undocumented-immigrants-animals.html>; Eli Rosenberg, “‘The Snake’: How Trump appropriated a 
radical black singer’s lyrics for immigration fearmongering”, The Washington Post (24 February 2018), 
online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/02/24/the-snake-how-trump-
appropriated-a-radical-black-singers-lyrics-for-refugee-
fearmongering/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c5c916913cf0>; and Katherine Krueger, “Trump Resurrects 
His Most Infamous Anti-Immigrant Statement to Smear Migrant Caravan”, Splinter News (5 April 2018), 
online: <https://splinternews.com/trump-resurrects-his-most-infamous-anti-immigrant-state-1825026371>. 
77 For a timeline of the “Muslim ban” suspending entry of immigrants from listed Muslim majority countries 
(and now North Korea and Venezuela), see “Timeline of the Muslim Ban”, ACLU Washington (blog), 
online: <https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban>. 
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like situations (some of which have been judicially halted or superseded by other 
policies) have included the following:  
 
• Criminal Prosecution of asylum seekers for illegal entry78 
• Automatic and indeterminate detention of all asylum seekers arriving at the 
southern border, whether they enter irregularly or appear at a port of entry 
requesting asylum79 
• Separation of children from parents at the southern border (whether 
presenting at a port of entry or entering irregularly); indeterminate detention 
of families80 
• Refusal to process asylum claims made at a port of entry81  
• Cancellation of Temporary Protected Status for nationals of Sudan,82 
Nicaragua,83 Haiti,84 El Salvador,85 Liberia,86 Nepal,87 and Honduras.88 
                                                 
78 “Punishing Refugees and Migrants: The Trump Administration's Misuse of Criminal Prosecutions”, 
Human Rights First (January 2018), online: https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/2018-
Report-Punishing-Refugees-Migrants.pdf [Punishing Refugees]. As a State Party to the UN Refugee 
Convention, the United States is also bound by Article 31 of the Convention, which prevents prosecution of 
refugees for unlawful entry. 
79 “Fear Mongering and Alternative Facts: The Trump Administration’s Attacks on Asylum”, Human Rights 
First (19 March 2018), online: <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Fear-Mongering-
Alternative-Facts.pdf>.  
80 Caitlin Dickerson, “Hundreds of Immigrant Children Have Been Taken From Parents at U.S. Border”, 
The New York Times (20 April 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/us/immigrant-
children-separation-ice.html>. 
81 “Crossing the Line: US Border Agents Reject Asylum Seekers”, Human Rights First (May 2017), online: 
<https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-line-report.pdf>. 
82 Reuters Staff, “U.S. ends temporary protected status for Sudanese but extends it for South Sudanese”, 
Reuters (18 September 2017), online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-sudan/u-s-
ends-temporary-protected-status-for-sudanese-but-extends-it-for-south-sudanese-
idUSKCN1BT2RL?il=0>. 
83 Reuters Staff, “U.S. to end protected status for Nicaraguan immigrants in 2019”, Reuters (6 November 
2017), online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-protections/u-s-to-end-protected-
status-for-nicaraguan-immigrants-in-2019-idUSKBN1D704X>. 
84 Miriam Jordan, “Trump Administration Ends Temporary Protection for Haitian”, The New York Times 
(20 November 2017), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/haitians-temporary-status.html>. 
85 Miriam Jordan, “Trump Administration Says That Nearly 200,000 Salvadorans Must Leave”, The New 
York Times (8 January 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/us/salvadorans-tps-
end.html?mtrref=www.google.com>. 
86 Michael D Shear, “Trump Ends Temporary Immigration Status for Thousands of Liberians”, The New 
York Times (27 March 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/politics/trump-temporary-
immigration-status-liberians.html>. 
87 Reuters Staff, “U.S. says to end protected status for 9,000 Nepalese immigrants”, Reuters (26 April 2018), 
online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-nepal/us-says-to-end-protected-status-for-
9000-nepalese-immigrants-idUSKBN1HX2X4>. 
88 President Trump reportedly called Haiti and African states “shithole countries” when explaining his 
opposition to TPS for nationals of those states. Josh Dawsey, “Trump derides protections for immigrants 
from ‘shithole’ countries”, The Washington Post (12 January 2018), online: 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-
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• Reduced ability of asylum seekers to obtain legal representation for asylum 
claims89 
• Elevation of the standard for satisfying a ‘credible fear’ of persecution 
necessary to prevent expedited removal from the United States without 
adjudication of an asylum claim90 
• Reversal by Attorney-General Sessions of jurisprudence that resulted in 
refugee protection for women fleeing domestic violence and people fleeing 
gang violence.91  
• Reversal of requirement for full hearing of all asylum claims before 
Immigration judges92 
 
At least some – possibly several – of these measures violate international refugee law 
and human rights obligations binding on Canada and the United States. In June 2018, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the practice of 
separating children from parents in order to deter migrants and asylum seekers, noting 
that, “the practice of separating families amounts to arbitrary and unlawful interference 
in family life, and is a serious violation of the rights of the child”93. 
 
The post-Trump election policies and practices exacerbate those features of 
the US asylum system that, in 2008, led the Federal Court of Canada to conclude that 
the United States asylum regime did not comply with Article 33 of the UN Refugee 
Convention, which protects refugees from refoulement.94 Cumulatively, they provide 
a welter of new evidence about the altered character of the United States as a putatively 
safe country for asylum seekers to obtain refugee protection that did not exist in 2009, 
when the prior STCA litigation came to an end.   
 
                                                 
countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af-
31ac729add94_story.html?utm_term=.2ff5892103b5>. See also Richard Gonzales, “Trump Administration 
Ends Temporary Protected Status For Hondurans”, NPR (4 May 2018), online: 
<https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/04/608654408/trump-administration-ends-temporary-
protected-status-for-hondurans>. 
89 Punishing Refugees, supra note 78 at 3–4. 
90 Ibid at 5–6. 
91 Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, “Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence Are Not Grounds for 
Asylum”, The New York Times (12 June 2018), online: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html>. 
92 Antonio Olivo, “Advocates say Sessions’s decision to toss rule on asylum hearings endangers thousands”, 
The Washington Post (7 March 2018), online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-
issues/advocates-sessions-decision-to-toss-rule-on-asylum-hearings-endangers-
thousands/2018/03/07/24b63b24-2214-11e8-94da-ebf9d112159c_story.html?utm_term=.88c280a09589>. 
93 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Press Briefing Note on Egypt, United States and 
Ethiopia” (5 June 2018), online: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23174&LangID=E.>.  
94 See the Federal Court’s analysis of US compliance with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, supra note 
67 at paras 143–240. 
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Consider this comparison:  a Honduran woman is subject to ongoing, brutal 
domestic violence from her spouse in a country. Honduras has the highest femicide 
rate in the world. Her husband threatens to kill her if she leaves.  The police do nothing 
to protect women in her situation, and she gives up seeking their assistance. She flees 
with her children.  If she could reach Canada to make her refugee claim, it is unlikely 
that she or her children will be detained.  If she can establish the elements of her claim 
before the Immigration and Refugee Board, her refugee claim and her children’s claim 
could be accepted. If she attempts to make an asylum claim in the United States, she 
and her children will be arrested and prosecuted for illegal entry and they will be 
detained under harsh conditions, possibly separately. And, the woman’s refugee claim 
will be refused. She will be deported back to Honduras.95 The Canada-US Safe Third 
Country Agreement dictates that this woman must make her refugee claim in the 
United States because it is a safe country for her to seek and obtain refugee protection. 
 
In order for the current round of litigation to surmount the Federal Court of 
Appeal precedent, the actual consequences to asylum seekers of returning them to the 
United States must be regarded as relevant to the legality of designating the United 
States as safe. Asylum seekers must matter in law. Justice Rand in Roncarelli, and 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Baker offer a vision of the rule of law that would mandate 
attention to the impact of state action on those subject to it; the Federal Court of Appeal 
rejected that vision. 
  
When individuals cross irregularly into Canada at Roxham Road in the 
presence of an RCMP officer, the same ritual performance is re-enacted over and over:  
the RCMP officer recites a scripted warning to border crossers that it is illegal to cross 
into Canada, that they will be committing a crime if they do so, and will be arrested.  
Because border crossers have typically been informed in advance about what to 
expect,96 and so they cross anyway, state that they wish to seek protection in Canada. 
The RCMP officer arrests them and deliver them to CBSA for processing as refugee 
claimants under the IRPA. I explained earlier that irregular entry does not violate the 
IRPA as long as an individual presents herself for examination at a port of entry 
without delay. In any event, refugees cannot be penalized for unlawful entry. So, are 
RCMP officers lying to border crossers when they warn them that they will be 
committing an unlawful act? Not exactly.   
 
                                                 
95 Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec 316 (AG 2018), online: 
<https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/download>. See also John Washington, “ICE Is Sending 
a Message to the World’s Asylum Seekers: The US Is No Place of Refuge”, The Nation (29 May 2018), 
online: < https://www.thenation.com/article/ice-is-sending-a-message-to-the-worlds-asylum-seekers-the-
us-is-no-place-of-refuge/> and Robert Moore, “At the U.S. border, asylum seekers fleeing violence are told 




96 See for example this pamphlet prepared by refugee support group Plattsburgh Cares, “For Asylum Seekers 
Crossing Into Canada”, Plattsburgh Cares, online: <https://plattsburghcares.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/newenglish6.pdf>. 
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The Canadian Customs Act97 governs payment of duty on goods imported 
into Canada. It applies, for example, when a Canadian shops abroad and re-enters 
Canada. The individual declares the value of purchases upon entry to Canada and may 
be required to pay duty.  Section 11 of the Customs Act states as follows: 
 
11 (1) Subject to this section, every person arriving in Canada shall, except 
in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, 
enter Canada only at a customs office designated for that purpose that is 
open for business and without delay present himself or herself to an officer 
and answer truthfully any questions asked by the officer in the performance 
of his or her duties under this or any other Act of Parliament.98 
 
The illegal act prompting the arrest of border crossers is failure to present at a 
designated port of entry in order to declare imported goods. The substantive unlawful 
act to which the Customs Act is addressed is not entry as such, but the payment of duty 
on imported goods.  No one alleges that refugee claimants entering Canada irregularly 
are evading the payment of duty and I know of no instance where a refugee claimant 
was actually tried or convicted of an offence under the Customs Act.  Yet it is s. 11 of 
the Customs Act that enables the RCMP to warn – and the public to accept – that 
irregular border crossers commit an “illegal entry” into Canada.   
 
Here is an actual form recording the arrest of an irregular border crosser. Note 
that the nature of the event is described as “illegal entry”, but the offence is “s. 11, 
Non report, customs act”.  No breach of the IRPA is indicated. 
 
 
                                                 
97 Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1.  
 
98 Ibid at s 11(1).   
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It is clear that the RCMP and CBSA collaborate on a range of operational 
matters, including irregular border crossing. But, they are creatures of different 
statutes; their respective legislative mandates are distinct, though they overlap at the 
edges.  RCMP officers have all the powers, authority, protection and privileges of a 
peace officer.  These relate to “preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and 
of offences against the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which 
they may be employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others 
who may be lawfully taken into custody”. 99 Canadian Border Services Agency officers 
enforce the IRPA as well as other statutes such as the Customs Act,100 the Excise Tax 
Act,101 the Export and Import Permits Act,102 and the Proceeds of Crime (Money 
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.103  
 
The RCMP have a mandate to investigate crime, including smuggling and 
trafficking in persons, and crimes related to national security. The role of the RCMP, 
however, is not to determine admissibility to Canada or eligibility to claim refugee 
status under the IRPA. Those tasks fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Canadian Border Services Agency, which is why the RCMP generally detain, search 
and then transport asylum seekers to the nearest designated port of entry. 
  
But in Roxham, Quebec, something else began happening in 2017. The 
Roxham RCMP detachment, which was extremely busy intercepting border crossers, 
devised a three-page questionnaire that RCMP administered to all border crossers.104 
 
 
                                                 
99 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c R-10, s 18(a). 
100 Customs Act, supra note 97.  
101 Excise Tax Act, RSC 1985, c E-15.  
102 Export and Import Permits Act, RSC 1985, c E-19.  
103 Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, SC 2000, c 17.  
104 “Interview”, RCMP, online: <https://www.scribd.com/document/361351906/The-RCMP-s-Roxham-
Rd-questionnaire#from_embed> [on file with author].  
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The first few questions seem ordinary enough:  
 
Where do you come from? 
Why did you not come to a border crossing? 
How long have you been in the United States? 
Who informed you about how to get to Canada? What were you told? 
What motivated you to leave the United States? 
Did you use a passport of another nationality to travel? 
 
These questions are relevant to law enforcement duties since, for example, human 
smuggling, forgery and passport fraud are also criminal offences.  As the questioning 
progresses, the inquiry begins to veer away from past criminality toward future risks:  
 
Have you ever been arrested? 
Have you ever committed a criminal offence? 
Are you being sought by the police or other government authorities from 
your or any other country? 
Do you have any criminal intentions while in Canada? 
If someone around you commits an offence or a reprimandable act, what 
would you do?  
Would you denounce him or her?  
Do you have affiliations with political groups? 
Have you ever contributed to organizations or political groups? 
Do you have any intentions to protest in Canada about the events that are 
taking place in your country? 
 
The problematic nature of some questions is heightened because they are posed by 
RCMP officers with no contextual understanding of refugees and asylum seekers.  For 
instance, refugees may have been (illegitimately) targeted by their states of nationality 
for arrest, detention and criminal prosecution precisely because of their race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or social identity. Questions about past arrests, or whether 
the individual is sought by authorities in the country of origin, are not inherently 
objectionable, but they take on a different and troubling hue when posed of an asylum 
seeker under these circumstances.  Beyond that, several questions appear to regard the 
exercise of democratic rights (political affiliation, protest, etc.) as denoting a security 
risk, which is clearly troubling. 
 
In short order, the questionnaire moves on to unabashedly discriminatory, 
Islamophobic questions:  
 
What is your religion?  
Do you practice your religion? How often? 
What is your opinion about terrorist attacks?  
What is your opinion about the group Islamic State? 
Canada is a very liberal country that believes in freedom of religious practice and 
equality between men and women.  
What is your opinion on this subject?  
How would you feel if your boss was a woman?  
How do you feel about women who do not wear the  
• Hijab (covers the head),  
• Dupatta (covers head and shoulders),  
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• Chador (covers head and body),  
• Niqab (covers head, face and body),  
• Burka (covers the entire body, including the eyes) 
 
If nothing else, the questionnaire encapsulates a perception of the mandate of 
RCMP officers as a combination of policing the geo-political borders of the state and 
policing the ethno-religious borders of the nation. For present purposes, I wish to 
emphasize the narrow point that many questions simply resist any attempt to situate 
them within any plausible account of the statutory mandate of the RCMP.  To bring it 
back to Roncarelli, the religious faith of border crossers is no more relevant to the 
RCMP’s job at Roxham Road than is Roncarelli’s religious faith relevant to a liquor 
licence decision. A central – even defining – feature of legality is that public officials 
do not use the powers conferred on them by the legislator to attain goals extraneous to 
the purpose for which those powers were conferred. It is hard to find a more flagrant 
excess of jurisdiction than some of these questions posed by the RCMP officers from 
the Roxham detachment. 
 
Had the questions been conjured in the moment by one or a few rogue RCMP 
officers, the rule of law would not necessarily have been engaged. One might have 
characterized it as an abuse of power by a handful of individuals – the usual “bad 
apples” story used to protect an institution’s reputation from infection by the 
misconduct of their personnel. But consider the context here: these questions appear 
in an official questionnaire printed on RCMP masthead. The RCMP is a large 
government organization. This questionnaire is not the work of a single individual, but 
of an organization with layers of bureaucracy and managerial control modeled on a 
military hierarchy. This questionnaire must have been vetted and viewed by many 
people within the RCMP organization, even if it did not reach the highest levels.  The 
questionnaire was administered to 5438 individuals over the course of a year.105 The 
responses were entered into both RCMP and CBSA databases.  It only came to public 
attention when a refugee claimant was handed his completed form by mistake, and 
then showed it to his lawyer. In short, the questionnaire was part of the routine 
interaction between RCMP and border crossers, an interaction that appears on the 
surface as lawbreaker meets law enforcer. I hope I have given cause to think that 
appearances may be misleading. 
 
The good news is that as soon as Ralph Goodale, Minister of Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness, was alerted to the questionnaire, the RCMP was 
directed to withdraw it, redraft it, and to redact electronic records containing the 
offending questions and responses. It is not clear, however, whether the records have 
already been shared with the United States or any other country.   
 
Even so, the celerity of the Minister’s response is reassuring. It provides an 
opportunity to reiterate that I do not allege that the state is engaged in a relentless, 
                                                 
105 Michelle Shephard, “RCMP will redact more than 5,000 records collected using questionnaire targeting 
Muslim asylum seekers”, Toronto Star (27 November 2017), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/11/27/rcmp-will-redact-more-than-5000-records-collected-
using-questionnaire-targeting-muslim-asylum-seekers.html>. 
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wholesale negation of the rule of law in relation to non-citizens.  Nevertheless, I have 
presented instances that ought to be disquieting:  immigration legislation denies non-
citizens access to the ordinary courts for judicial review.  The executive can, according 
to the Federal Court of Appeal, lawfully designate a country as safe for asylum seekers 
to obtain refugee protection on a formal basis and with no accountability for the 
substantive content of the determination or its impact. A large and powerful state 
agency can spend an entire year routinely subjecting over 5,000 border crossers to a 
series of questions that are both discriminatory and extravagantly beyond the agency’s 
statutory mandate – without any internal oversight. These are neither the misdeeds of 
a few bad apples, nor the progeny of a government with callous disdain for the rule of 
law.   
 
Based on my exposure to the field of administrative law and migration law 
for over two decades, and allowing for the vicissitudes of changing governments, 
modes of governance, and so on, I believe that the distortions to the rule of the law 
that we witness in the field of immigration are both singular and chronic.  
 
What saps the rule of law’s vitality in regulating the encounter between the 
state and the non-citizen? I think the answers lie in two constitutive features of 
contemporary sovereignty – territoriality and status.  That the security of the state is 
most imperiled by external threat – the foreigner – is not only or mainly an empirical 
claim; it is an article of faith. The border operates as a reified site for the perpetual, 
almost liturgical, performance of that anxiety. The border faces inward on the domestic 
order structured through legal relations between state and legal subjects, but outward 
toward an international order that is conceived in terms of power relations among 
states and foreigners, which in turn have grown more securitized in recent years. At 
the risk of being reductive, the character of relations at the border are shaped much 
more by the external than the internal perspective. When I teach my students, I always 
warn them that you are nowhere more powerless than at a border, even when entering 
your own country of citizenship. The rule of law thins out as it edges toward the border.  
 
The other dimension is status. The traditional common law posture toward 
non-citizens (or aliens), quoted and paraphrased for over a hundred years throughout 
the commonwealth – including in Charter jurisprudence – is articulated most starkly 
in Canada (AG) v Cain:106 
 
One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right 
to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it 
pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport from the State, 
at pleasure, even a friendly alien [...].107 
 
According to this, the sovereign’s power over the alien is as close to absolute, 
unfettered, and untrammelled as one can imagine – the very antithesis of Justice 
Rand’s famous declaration to the contrary in Roncarelli. As raw and unfiltered as the 
                                                 
106 Canada (Attorney General) v Cain, [1906] AC 542, 1906 CarswellOnt 761. 
107 Ibid at 546. 
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dictum in Canada (AG) v Cain is, it continues to reverberate in every encounter 
between state and alien.  Its effect is to make the non-citizen a privilege holder in 
perpetuity, because the non-citizen’s legal existence in the jurisdiction – their presence 
on the territory – is always subject to the discretion of the sovereign. In a technical 
sense, this is not entirely accurate, because we have an immigration statute according 
to which non-citizens possess some statutory rights, state power is constrained in 
various ways, and the exercise of discretion – like the humanitarian and compassionate 
discretion in Baker – are bounded by law. But my point is that just as Frank 
Roncarelli’s status as citizen anchored Justice Rand’s insistence that he be treated with 
dignity and respect in the allocation of a privilege by administrative actors, the 
privilege-holder-in-perpetuity status of an “alien” erodes her claim to be regarded as a 
full legal subject and bearer of rights, even if those rights are secured by statute, 
constitution, or international law.108  
 
The rule of law has not yet succeeded in making the state as accountable to 
non-citizens as it is to citizens, even as the state asserts its legal authority over both 
citizen and non-citizen alike. To the extent that genuine adherence to the rule of law 
requires internalization of its tenets by all branches and all levels of government, the 
project stumbles – but does not always fall – because the idea expressed in Canada 
(AG) v Cain continues to pervade law, policy, and discourse as an edict about the 
nature of sovereignty and the place of citizenship within it. It makes immigration law 
distinctively arbitrary and non-citizens uniquely vulnerable. We should, we can and 
we must do better at ensuring that the rule of law stumbles less often and less badly.
                                                 
108 I develop this hypothesis further in relation to section 7 of the Charter in “Facing the Constitution”, in 
David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole, eds, The Double Facing Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming). 
